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Policy-makers are often unnecessarily timid in imposing
climate change regulations
When governments design policies to reduce firms’ greenhouse gas emissions, are they too
lenient on heavy polluters that claim such measures will damage their ability to compete in
the global economy? Ralf Martin, Laure de Preux and Ulrich Wagner assess the UK’s
experience with the climate change levy.
The idea that people who are responsible f or creating a mess should be charged f or its
removal resonates with common perceptions of  f airness. But in public policy-making, even bef ore the
f inancial crisis, there are many examples of  this idea being turned on its head.
Climate change policy is one such area – a problem inherently linked to the realit ies of  trying locally to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions that are thoroughly global in their impact. Despite many ef f orts to
coordinate policies across countries since the signing of  the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change 20 years ago, climate change policy is still very much a localised af f air.
So although some governments are trying to reduce emissions, they also worry about the possible
negative ef f ects of  pollution legislation on the competit iveness of  their countries or regions. In a
globalised economy, such concerns are not unf ounded as the dynamics of  comparative advantage are
conducive to shif t ing pollution- intensive production f rom regulated to unregulated regions.
Regulated f irms also have every incentive to play up the risks to their competit iveness even if  there is no
basis f or their claims. What’s worse is that governments have litt le to go by in evaluating such risks other
than the assessments of  the regulated f irms themselves. And irrespective of  any risks to f irms’ ability to
compete against their counterparts in less regulated places, it is the biggest emitters who have the
biggest incentives and deepest pockets to lobby against any regulations.
Hence, it does not seem f ar- f etched to consider the hypothesis that risk-averse polit icians are of ten
unnecessarily t imid in imposing climate change regulations and are likely to adopt a more lenient
approach than would be desirable.
To examine this hypothesis, we have looked at the ef f ects of  the UK’s climate change levy, an energy tax
introduced by the UK government in 2001 supposedly to give f irms an incentive to reduce their energy
consumption and thereby their greenhouse gas emissions. In parallel, motivated by concerns about
competit iveness, the government granted a signif icant discount – init ially 80% and later reduced to 65%
– f rom the tax to a large number of  industrial sectors whose competit iveness was presumed to be at
risk.
But eligibility f or the discount scheme was not based on an analysis of  how exposed f irms were to
international competit ion. Rather – primarily f or legal reasons – eligibility was given to f irms with polluting
processes that were regulated under legislation passed prior to 2001 known as ‘pollution prevention and
control’ (PPC).
The f act that emitters of  conventional pollutants are the ones benef it ing f rom the tax discount might not
have been a problem of  course if  there were a strong overlap between the PPC-regulated f irms and
those potentially threatened by international competit ion. That is a question that our research has been
able to investigate.
Using the management interview approach developed at CEP (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), we
conducted interviews with managers in almost 200 UK manuf acturing f irms to gather inf ormation on
many aspects of  f irm behaviour related to climate change issues. The interviews were conducted as part
of  a larger survey of  800 f irms in six European countries (Martin et al, 2011; Martin et al, 2012; Anderson
et al, 2011).
On the basis of  the survey, we constructed a number of  f irm-level scores. Figures 1 and 2 report
statistics on scores that are indicative of  whether a f irm’s competit iveness is at risk due to climate
change policies.
Figure 1 displays a score that is directly based on asking managers if  they expect that their f irms will
downsize or indeed exit the UK (and Europe) due to climate change policies during the next 10 years. We
see very litt le dif f erence between f irms that benef it f rom the tax discount compared with those that do
not.
The same conclusion emerges when looking at the extent to which managers believe that they can pass
on cost increases f rom the tax to customers in the f orm of  higher prices (‘cost pass-through’) or when
considering the share of  f oreign non- European Union competitors that a f irm has (see Figure 2). If  the
competit iveness of  f irms eligible f or the discount is at risk, we should see that they have lower cost
pass through rates, a higher share of  overseas competitors or both.
Hence, the government’s way of  identif ying f irms whose competit iveness is at risk seems to be solidly
of f  target. While this is deplorable f rom a policy point of  view, it opens up a unique opportunity f or
researchers to examine if  an energy tax such as the climate change levy has the negative impact that
industry lobby groups claim.
Figure 1 indicates that roughly two in f ive managers report that climate change policy may have a
negative impact on their f irm to the extent that they expect to downsize or completely close down. But it
is striking that these f irms are f airly equally distributed between those that pay the f ull climate change
levy and those that benef it f rom the tax discount.
A comparison of  what happened to f irms in the two categories f ollowing the 2001 introduction of  the
climate change levy should thus give us a good idea of  the ef f ects of  such an energy tax. We turn to this
next.
Figure 3 reports the average dif f erence in growth rates of  various f irm level outcomes between f irms
that are eligible f or the tax discount and those paying the f ull levy bef ore and af ter 2001 (Martin et al,
2009). We see that the growth rate of  employment as well as output in f irms that were not eligible f or the
tax discount was on average more than two percentage points higher than in eligible f irms.
Similarly, there is no signif icant dif f erence in terms of  productivity. In f urther analysis, we have conf irmed
that there is no signif icant dif f erence in plant exit either. If  there were any impact on competit iveness, we
would expect that f irms without the tax discount would be contracting f aster and would be more likely to
exit.
We also repeated this analysis f or dif f erent sub-samples in our data, f or example, f ocusing on more
energy intensive f irms, which might be expected to be more at risk. Again we f ind no evidence of  negative
ef f ects on competiveness.
In contrast, we do f ind signif icant dif f erences when looking at the growth rate of  f irms’ energy
consumption, which is the target of  a tax such as the climate change levy. Our results suggest that f irms
paying the levy in f ull reduce energy consumption at a rate more than 5% higher than f irms benef it ing
f rom the discount (see Figure 3).
What are the implications of  our results? First, there is no evidence that f irms with the tax discount are
f acing higher risks to their competit iveness than f irms that pay the f ull climate change levy. Moreover, we
cannot f ind any evidence f or negative ef f ects on competit iveness. Not only does this suggest that the
current system of  granting discounts is badly targeted but also that there is no justif ication f or the
discount.
Second, f irms that pay the f ull tax reduce their energy use and thereby their greenhouse gas emissions
by more than benef iciaries f rom the discount. Thus, by granting discounts, the government is losing out
twice: f irst, by missing out on tax revenues in the order of  £350 million a year; and second, by achieving
less in terms of  reaching its targets on reducing emissions.
It would seem to be a no-brainer to abolish the discount and use the revenue in continuing ef f orts to
plug the budget def icit. Alternatively, the extra revenue could be recycled back to f irms via lower national
insurance contributions, as has been the practice with much of  the revenue f rom the climate change levy
to date.
But the UK government has reached a dif f erent conclusion. Although the discount scheme was supposed
to run out in April 2013, the government has recently decided to extend it until at least 2020. It is currently
f inalising the details of  the legislation to bring it bef ore parliament in September this year.
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